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Abstract—Consumer return attracts more and more academic
attention due to its rapidly expanding size, and a large portion
of it falls into the category of false failure return, which refers
to return without functional defect. In this paper, we exclusively
consider profit results from exerting costly effort to reduce false
failure returns in a reverse supply chain consisting of a retailer
and a supplier. The supply chain as a whole has strong incentive
to reduce false failure returns because it can avoid much re-
processing cost associated. But typically, retailers enjoy a full
credit provided by suppliers in case of returns, and hence they
may not have sufficient incentives to exert enough effort for
supply chain profit maximization. In some scenarios they may
even have the motivation to actually encourage such returns.
We suggest using a coordination contract to resolve such profit
conflicts. The contract we propose is a quantity discount contract
specifying a payment to the retailer with an amount exponentially
decreasing in the number of false failure returns. We give
explicit forms of such contracts given different assumptions about
distribution of the number of returns and we also prove that such
contract is capable of increasing both retailer’s and supplier’s
profit simultaneously. Besides, when the contract is used together
with other forward supply chain coordination contracts in a
closed-loop chain, it is shown that it can act to deter retailer’s
potential incentive to encourage false failure returns. Moreover,
some modifications of the contract may lead to easy allocation
of incremental profit within the supply chain.
Keywords—Consumer Returns; Closed-loop Supply Chains;
Quantity Discount Contract; Supply Chain Coordination.
I. INTRODUCTION
Many firms now offer liberal return policies allowing cus-
tomers to return the products for any reasons within some
time (typically 90 days) after the purchases. The volume of
such consumer returns is rapidly increasing and has already
exceeded $100 billion per year in the U.S., see for instance
[8]. However, a large portion (95% in the electronic industry
in the U.S. by [7]) of them are results of reasons other than
functional defects of the products. For example, the customer
may regret over an impulse purchase, or find out later that
the product is not suitable or too difficult to use. This kind of
returns is referred to as “false failure returns” in [2]. This is
the main subject we are going to study in this paper.
Another closely related concept here is the closed-loop
supply chain and the reverse supply chain. According to [4],
the process of material flowing from suppliers for manufac-
turing and then to retailers for selling and finally purchased
by customers is referred to as a forward supply chain. Then,
in case of returns, the process of retailers accepting the
returned products from customers and transferring them back
to suppliers for possible re-manufacturing is referred to as a
reverse supply chain. The forward and the reverse together
form a closed-loop supply chain. Usually, studies on reverse
supply chain are motivated by two reasons. The first one
concerns sustainable development of the earth because re-
collected products can be used for recycling. Besides the
environmental consideration, the economical reason is that
material value now involved in returns is too large to be
ignored. Studies (for example, [4]) have shown that proper
design of the reverse supply chain may even bring in extra
profit to firms in addition to lowering its cost.
Although much existing literature focus on the planning or
the impact of re-manufacturing, this paper studies the incentive
conflicts in a reverse supply chain concerning exerting costly
effort to reduce false failure returns. Reducing such returns
is usually highly beneficial to suppliers. Suppliers who value
their brand image typically provide a full credit to retailers
and take the returned products back. And by [3], during the
take-back process, suppliers not only bear goodwill cost but
also have to pay for cost of possible test, refurbishment, re-
manufacture, recycle or loss in value of the products especially
for innovative or fashionable ones, see for instance, a discus-
sion in [5]. The sum of these costs could be substantial but
if the amount of returns is reduced, such loss can be avoided.
On the other hand, retailers do have to pay something in case
of a false failure return, for example, goodwill cost or fees of
reprocessing and transportation. But since they get full credit
from suppliers, their incentives of reducing such returns is
usually lower. In some circumstances, they may even want
to actively push the level of such returns, for instance, if the
product has poor demand.
This paper is devoted to designing a coordination mecha-
nism for a reverse supply chain in presence of false failure
returns. Specifically, we consider a supply chain consisting of
one retailer and one supplier. Attention is exclusively focused
on the profit and cost associated with false failure returns. The
operations in forward supply chain are thus not considered in
the first part of discussion. We will then incorporate the two
in a later section.
Consider the following events occurring in sequence: when
a customer brings in a false failure return, typically a full
money refund is provided by the retailer who later gets a full
credit of the wholesale price from the supplier and returns
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the product. Meanwhile, we assume effort can be exerted to
reduce the volume of false failure returns. Given the above
discussions, it is reasonable to add another assumption that
the supplier has already exerted all possible effort and all
possible remaining effort as well as the associated cost is to
be taken by the retailers. We show that the profit-maximizing
effort level chosen by the retailer is always less than the one
chosen from a supply chain’s point of view. This is sub-
optimal because the supply chain profit is eventually to be
split between retailer and supplier. The origin of this problem
is that retailer bears all the cost yet only enjoys partial benefit
of reducing amount of false failure returns. Hence here we aim
to design a contract specifying a way for the supplier to share
the cost by making a payment to the retailer, so as to induce the
retailer to exert global optimal level of effort. In addition, we
prove under certain conditions, such contract is also capable
of improving both parties’ profit simultaneously. Specifically,
the contract payment in our proposed coordination contract
is exponentially decreasing in the returned amount. This is
very similar to the quantity discount contract, which is a
coordination contract in forward supply chain that specifies a
wholesale price decreasing in order quantity. Therefore we will
refer to our contract as a quantity discount contract throughout
the paper. It is reasonable to have contract payment decreasing
in the number of the false failure returns for two reasons.
First, it is hard to directly contract on effort level since it is
very difficult to be verified. Second, a lower returns level is
rather credibly indicating that retailer is exerting effort, and
thus should be compensated more in this case. In order to
give the explicit formula for determining contract parameters,
we consider two cases of distribution of the number of false
failure returns. In the first case, we consider the number to
be geometrically distributed. Since such return is a result
of consumer’s individual decision rather than because of the
quality of the product itself, hence they are independent among
themselves. So the geometric distribution, which is memo-
ryless, would be a reasonable distribution for this random
variable. In the second case, the number of returns is assumed
to have a Poisson distribution, which is more general. The
results obtained here would be more accurate if sales volume
is large or the period under consideration is long.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we set up the model of the problem, and optimal choices of
effort level by supply chain and retailer are shown respectively.
The design of coordination contracts given different distri-
butions of the number of false failure returns are presented
in Section III. Section IV is devoted to a discussion of the
contract and a possible modification of the quantity discount
contract is presented. Concluding remarks are then given in
Section V.
II. THE MODEL
We study the performance of a supply chain consisting of
one retailer and one supplier in a single-period setting using
the model similar with that appeared in [2]. For every unit of
product, the supplier bears the manufacturing cost c and then
sells it to the retailer at wholesale price w. Finally the product
is sold in the market at retail price p. It is assumed that the
consumers, after the purchases, have the right to return the
products to the retailer anytime within the period. In case of
a false failure return, consumer gets a full refund of p from
the retailer, who later gets a full credit of w from the supplier.
Now we proceed to formulate the profit function of reducing
one unit of false failure return: first, the return comes at a cost,
such as goodwill cost and the possible re-processing cost. We
denote the sum of all these costs to the supplier as s and
the costs to the retailer as r. Moreover, after the return, the
consumer may choose to walk away, with certain probability
δs, or to make a repurchase from the same supplier. Hence the
value of loss on sale to the supplier can be written as δs(w−c).
Similarly, the value of loss on sale to the retailer is δr(p−w),
with δr being the probability that no repurchase from the same
retailer is made after the return. Combining these two kinds
of costs saved, the profit of avoiding one false failure return
is S = δs(w − c) + s to the supplier and R = δr(p− w) + r
to the retailer. On the other hand, as in [2], number of false
failure returns, which denoted as X(ρ), is modeled to be a
non-negative random variable depending on the effort level ρ.
Denote its Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) as F (x|ρ)
and Probability Mass Function (PMF) as f(x|ρ). It is assumed
that ρ ≥ 1 (at least a minimal level of effort has to be exerted),
and effort cost is
c(ρ) =
a
2
ρ2
because quadratic function can approximate two features of
effort cost: it is strictly increasing and has decreasing marginal
return. Assume that
E{X(ρ)} = β
ρ
where β = E{X(ρ = 1)}
i.e. β is the number of false failure returns when minimal level
of effort is in force. As in [2], we confine our attention to the
impact of false failure returns on profit of the supply chain.
The profit of supply chain as a whole can be valued as
Π(ρ) = (S+R)(E{X(1)}−E{X(ρ)})−a
2
ρ2 = (S+R)β(1−1
ρ
)−a
2
ρ2
(1)
Note that the first term is the product of expected profit
of avoiding one false failure return and expected number of
reduced units with effort ρ, which is just the expected total
profit. Then cost is subtracted to give the net profit.
We want to find an effort level ρ to maximize the supply
chain profit. To this end, we set 0 = ∂Π(ρ)∂ρ =
(S+R)β
ρ2 − aρ,
solving it yields
ρC =
(
S + R
a
β
)1/3
. (2)
Second order condition is checked by: ∂
2Π(ρ)
∂ρ2 = − 2(S+R)βρ3 −
a < 0. Hence Π(ρ) is actually concave in ρ and the ρC
above is the effort level such that the supply chain profit is
maximized. ρC ≥ 1 is always assumed.
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Note that since supply chain profit is the sum of profit
earned by both retailer and supplier. So with any transfer
payment between the two, results in this section still hold.
A. Decentralized Case
Now we investigate the supply chain in absence of any
contracts between the the retailer and supplier concerning false
failure returns. As in [2] and has been justified above, all effort
and associated cost of reducing returns is assumed to be taken
by the retailer. Like the supply chain profit, retailer’s profit
can be calculated as
ΠR(ρ) = Rβ(1− 1
ρ
)− 1
2
aρ2. (3)
We can easily verify that ρ = (Rβa )
1/3 is the maximal solution
by solving ∂ΠR(ρ)∂ρ =
Rβ
ρ2 − aρ = 0, and check that ΠR(ρ) is
concave on ρ because ∂
2ΠR(ρ)
∂ρ2 = − 2Rβρ3 − a < 0. But since
retailer has to exert at least minimal amount of effort, hence
the effort level chosen by retailer to maximize his/her own
profit would be
ρD = max
{(
Rβ
a
)1/3
, 1
}
It is obvious that ρC ≥ ρD, which means that if without any
coordination, the retailer always chooses an effort level that is
lower than the supply chain optimum. This disagreement arises
because the retailer pays all the cost but only gets less expected
profit than the supply chain does. Some wealth is transferred
to the supplier who is paying nothing. So it would be expected
that in order to induce the retailer to exert supply chain optimal
effort, the supplier should compensate the retailer for part of
the cost.
And in the following discussions, the condition ρC =(
S+R
a β
)1/3
> 1 is always assumed, because otherwise,
ρC = ρD = 1, the supply chain is already in coordination.
Similar to the above, supplier’s profit with effort level ρ
would be
ΠS(ρ) = Sβ(1− 1
ρ
) (4)
III. THE QUANTITY DISCOUNT CONTRACT
In this section, we propose a quantity discount contract
specifying a payment by supplier to retailer to induce the
later to exert supply chain optimal level of effort and hence
to achieve coordination. The payment amount is exponentially
decreasing in the number of false failure returns. Specifically,
the value of the payment is
P (x) = Tαx (5)
where x is the number of false failure returns; T is a contract
parameter with value equals to the payment by supplier if there
is no false failure return; α is another contract parameter sat-
isfying 0 < α < 1. Hence E{P (x|ρ)} =∑∞x=0(Tαx)f(x|ρ).
With such contract, retailer’s profit becomes
ΠR(ρ|(T, α)) = Rβ(1− 1
ρ
)− 1
2
aρ2 + E{P (x|ρ)} (6)
Similarly, supplier’s profit changes to
ΠS(ρ|(T, α)) = Sβ(1− 1
ρ
)−E{P (x|ρ)} (7)
We examine how this contract works under two scenarios, one
with X(ρ) following a geometric distribution, the other with
X(ρ) following a Poisson distribution.
A. The Geometric Distribution Case
In this section, the number of false failure returns is assumed
to be following a geometric distribution. Specifically, consider
f(x|ρ) =
(
ρ
ρ + β
)(
β
ρ + β
)x
with x = 0, 1, 2 . . . .
It can be easily checked that E{X(ρ)} = βρ is satisfied here.
The expected value of contract payment would be
E{P (x|ρ)} =
∞∑
x=0
Tαx
(
ρ
ρ + β
)(
β
ρ + β
)x
= T
(
ρ
ρ + k
)
(8)
with k = (1−α)β. The following proposition shows the form
of the coordination contract.
Proposition 1: Assuming the number of false failure returns
is geometrically distributed, then the quantity discount contract
specifying a payment of Tαx to the retailer with
T =
aS(k + ρC)2
k(S + R)
ρC and 0 < α < 1
can coordinate the supply chain.
All proofs can be found in [6].
Now we give a qualitative analysis of T = aS(k+ρC)
2
k(S+R) ρC .
Note that T increases in S, a and β yet decreases in R. The
reason is that T measures the payment size paid by supplier
to induce retailer to exert more effort to reach supply chain
optimal level, hence if S is large, that means more benefit
from the effort is transferred to supplier, so supplier should
have to compensate the retailer more. But when R is large,
retailers need less external incentive since they already benefit
more from the reduction itself. However, more cost-sharing is
needed when a is larger because it implies higher effort cost.
T is also positively related to β because a larger β means that
per unit effort exerted can bring down a larger number of false
failure returns hence it becomes more urgent and supplier is
willing to pay more for it.
Proposition 2: With the quantity discount contract de-
scribed above, the retailer’s profit is always increased while
the supplier is better off if and only if
1
ρD
− 2
ρC
>
1
β
and 0 < α ≤ 1− 1
β( 1ρD − 2ρC )
.
To interpret the proposition, note that E{P (x|ρC)}, which
is the payment born by the supplier in coordination, increases
in α. If α is too large, the payment may outweigh the benefit
of exerting effort, so it may actually damage the supplier’s
profit. Besides, it is of interest to compare the result here
with the one in [2]. In that paper the condition for supplier
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to be better off is 1ρD − 2ρC > 0, which is equivalent to
S > 7R. But here we require 1ρC − 2ρC > 1β , which implies
S should be greater than an amount even larger than 7R. The
reason is that, although [2] is applying a target rebate contract
under the assumption that X(ρ) is normally distributed, which
is different from our settings, it has been shown that in
coordination E{P (x|ρC)} = SβρC in that paper while here we
have E{P (x|ρC)} = SβρC +
Sβ
k . Hence in comparison, we
are actually asking the supplier to pay more to the retailer.
So correspondingly, the profit of effort transferred to the
supplier, which can be measured by S, should be larger here
to guarantee the supplier’s profit increment.
B. The Poisson Distribution Case
In this section, the number of false failure returns is assumed
to follow a Poisson distribution to model for a more general
scenario. Specifically, we consider
f(x|ρ) = (β/ρ)
x
x!
e−β/ρ with x = 0, 1, 2 . . . .
It can be easily checked that E{X(ρ)} = βρ holds as proposed.
Expected value of contract payment is
E{P (x|ρ)} =
∞∑
x=0
(β/ρ)x
x!
e−β/ρTαx = Te
β
ρ (α−1). (9)
We now aim to find a coordination contract under this distri-
bution.
Proposition 3: When the number of false failure returns
has a Poisson distribution, the quantity discount contract
specifying a payment Tαx by supplier can coordinate the
supply chain with
T =
S
1− αe
β
ρC
(1−α)
and α ∈ (max{1− 3(S + R)
Sβ
ρC , 0}, 1).
Comparing the form of the quantity discount contract ensur-
ing supply chain coordination in the last section with the one
here, it can be seen that with geometrically distributed X(ρ),
α can be any number in (0, 1), while in the case of X(ρ) being
a Poisson distributed random variable α cannot be falling into
too low a range under some conditions. Possible explanation
for this may be that with the same mean βρC , geometrically
distributed X(ρ) tends to cluster at a low range while Poisson
distributed one is more dense around the mean, so given the
payment amount is of the form Tαx, α cannot be too small
in the later case because the retailer gets small payments with
higher probability than in the first case.
Take a close look into T = S1−αe
β
ρC
(1−α)
, we conclude that
the value of T increases in a and β while decreases in R. The
analysis and the rationale are similar with the one in the last
section.
Proposition 4: Under the assumption that X(ρ) has a Pois-
son distribution, if the contract specified in Proposition 3 is
adopted, the retailer will be earning more if
max{0, 1−2ρC(ρ
2
C + ρCρD + ρ
2
D)
β(ρ2C + ρCρD − 2ρ2D)
} < α < 1 when ρD = (Rβ
a
)1/3
max{0, 1− 2ρC
β
} < α < 1 when ρD = 1
while the supplier will be better off if
0 < α ≤ 1− 1
β( 1ρD − 1ρC )
.
Proposition 5: To guarantee the contract in Proposition 3
is able to coordinate the supply chain and is also Pareto
improving for supplier and retailer, it is required that
max{0, 1− 2ρC(ρ
2
C + ρCρD + ρ
2
D)
β(ρ2C + ρcρD − 2ρ2D)
, 1− 3(S + R)
Sβ
ρC} < α
≤ 1− 1
β( 1ρD − 1ρC )
when ρD = (
Rβ
a
)1/3.
max{0, 1− 2ρC
β
, 1− 3(S + R)
Sβ
ρC} < α ≤ 1− 1
β( 1ρD − 1ρC )
when ρD = 1.
And to guarantee the existence of such α, it is required that
β(
1
ρD
− 1
ρC
) > 1
holds in any case. Moreover, if ρD = 1, then the followings
are also required
ρC ≥ 3/2 and β
α
>
(4S + 3R)3
27(S + R)4
.
IV. DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss the quantity discount contract
designed above from the aspect of implementation as well as
its impact on incentive when combined with a forward supply
chain contract. We then discuss some modifications of the
contract.
First, we believe that the quantity discount contract here is
attractive to retailers because by the design of it, there will
always be some payment to the retailer. And this payment is
larger in size if the number of false failure returns is lower,
hence it should be able to provide direct incentive for inducing
effort.
A. Incentives to Encourage False Failure Returns
Now we proceed to see how the contract works in co-
operation with forward supply chain contract in a closed-
loop supply chain context. As discussed in [2], when the
supplier is providing a full credit, retailers sometimes have
incentives to actually encourage sales even with awareness
of the high probability that the products may end up being
false failure returns. This actually works as a way to return
their inventory back to the suppliers. For example, retailers
may want to do so if they are selling something with poor
demand. Note that when the contract is absent, profit of a false
failure return includes the full credit of wholesale price w, and
the cost would be the sum of goodwill cost, re-processing
cost of the returns, the salvage value of unsold inventory
and possible refund from supplier for leftover inventory from
forward supply chain contract (for example, buy-back contract
or quantity flexibility contract). We sum these costs up and
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denote it as b. Retailer encourages returns whenever it is
beneficial to do so, i.e., when w > b. However, since quantity
discount contract gives the retailer a compensation which
is higher for lower level of returns, returns is costing the
retailer more, especially when returns level is high, denote this
difference as d. Hence the condition of beneficially pushing
false failure returns rises to w > b + d. Hence the contract
reduces the incentive of encouraging false failure returns all
the time.
B. Modification of the Contract
It has been demonstrated that the quantity discount contract
discussed above can coordinate a supply chain with false
failure returns and is also Pareto improving in the sense that
both retailer and supplier are better off with the contract.
However, how the increased supply chain profit is eventually
split between the two parties is not immediately clear. Here we
introduce one possible way of modifying the original contract
that results in arbitrary division of supply chain incremental
profit between retailer and supplier by adding a fixed payment
into the contract term.
To this end, define the followings: Δ′ΠS = Sβ( 1ρD − 1ρC ),
Δ′ΠR = Rβ( 1ρD − 1ρC ) − 12a(ρ2c − ρ2D) and ΔΠ = (R +
S)β( 1ρD − 1ρC )− 12a(ρ2c − ρ2D).
Proposition 6: A contract specifies a transfer payment with
an amount of Tαx − Q by supplier to retailer with (T, α)
as in Proposition1 when X(ρ) is geometrically distributed or
with (T, α) as in Proposition 3 when X(ρ) has a Poisson
distribution, and
Q = θΔ′ΠR − (1− θ)Δ′ΠS + E{P (x|ρC)}
is a coordination contract for the supply chain with 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1.
Moreover, this contract helps to allocate a portion θ of
increased supply chain profit to supplier and (1 − θ)ΔΠ to
retailer and hence guarantees the existence of Pareto improve-
ment for retailer and supplier.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we design a quantity discount contract to
resolve profit conflicts arising in a reverse supply chain. Here
we focus exclusively on cost and revenue result from exerting
effort to reduce false failure returns, which refers to customer
returns with no functional defects of the products. Since from
a supply chain’s point of view, reducing such returns is highly
beneficial because substantial goodwill cost and re-processing
cost can be saved. But to the retailer, incentive of doing so
may be distorted by having to pay all the cost of effort while
enjoying a full credit provided by the supplier in case of a
return. As a consequence, retailer always chooses an effort
level that is lower than the supply chain’s optimum. To tackle
this problem, we propose to apply a quantity discount contract
so as to induce retailer to exert more effort. Specifically, the
payment specified by the contract is exponentially decreasing
in the number of false failure returns. We give explicit for-
mulations of the contracts under different assumptions about
the distribution of the number of false failure returns. The
distribution is assumed to be geometric in the first case and
Poisson in the second case. It is proved that the contract
is able to successfully coordinate the supply chain, inducing
retailer to choose the desired effort level. We have also proved
that with the contract parameters properly set, retailer’s and
supplier’s profits are both increased at the same time. It is also
demonstrated that the contract has the function to deter retailer
from pushing false failure returns in the forward supply chain.
In addition, we show how the contract may be modified so that
it leads to easy allocation of the incremental profit within the
supply chain.
The study of reverse supply chain is attracting more and
more attention. Since coordination contracts in forward supply
chain have already been studied in depth and there are a lot
of available results, so in spite of the fact that most results
from forward supply chain cannot be directly applied in the
new context, they would serve as valuable references. The
design of the quantity discount contract here is an example.
We suggest this may be a further research direction. Some
other research directions may also include to generalize our
results in a more general setting, for example, to see how
the quantity discount contract may work with different return
policies offered by retailer to customers or to consider how to
modify the contract to be applied in a multiple-period setting
etc.
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